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Abstract
The trend of downsizing transistors and operating voltage
scaling has made the processor chip more sensitive against
radiation phenomena making soft errors an important chal-
lenge. New reliability techniques for handling soft errors
in the logic and memories that allow meeting the desired
failures-in-time (FIT) target are key to keep harnessing the
benefits of Moore’s law. The failure to scale the soft error
rate caused by particle strikes, may soon limit the total num-
ber of cores that one may have running at the same time.
This paper proposes a light-weight and scalable architec-
ture to eliminate silent data corruption errors (SDC) and de-
tected unrecoverable errors (DUE) of a core. The architec-
ture uses acoustic wave detectors for error detection. We pro-
pose to recover by confining the errors in the cache hierarchy,
allowing us to deal with the relatively long detection laten-
cies. Our results show that the proposed mechanism protects
the whole core (logic, latches and memory arrays) incurring
performance overhead as low as 0.60%.
1. Introduction
The large amount of transistors have fueled the growth of
big, in-memory data applications that were not feasible sev-
eral years ago. Moreover, because of the lower voltages and
the shrinking feature size, the vulnerability of the current and
future processors towards transient errors caused by particle
strikes is expected to increase rapidly [6].
With increased core counts per chip and larger memory ar-
rays, the total failure-in-time (FIT) per chip (or package) in-
creases. Decrease in the supply voltage to increase number
of cores results in even higher FIT rate [33]. Most of the
large memory blocks are already protected with error correct-
ing codes against both hard and soft errors. But logic ele-
ments and small arrays, which are the main contributors to
the majority of the soft error FIT budget [49], are largely un-
protected due to the huge cost of using hardened latches or
codes. Hardened latches and parity/error correction codes
have 20-30% overhead in terms of extra logic dedicated for
error detection and recovery [15, 44]. Hence, meeting the de-
sired FIT budget for current and future multicore systems is a
major challenge.
Architecturally, soft error detection and correction mecha-
nisms create two categories of errors: silent data corruption
(SDC) and detected unrecoverable errors (DUE). Chip design-
ers have fixed SDC- and DUE-FIT budgets for different appli-
cation segments similar to power or performance budgets. To
fulfill the SDC budget, designers may deploy simple error de-
tection schemes (i.e., parity). However adding parity converts
the SDC-FIT into DUE-FIT, adding pressure to the DUE bud-
get. To reduce the DUE, once the error has been detected the
system should be able to restore the normal state of operation.
For instance, error correction codes (i.e., single error correc-
tion) are used to provide recovery in memory.
Instead of relying on redundancy to detect errors (e.g.,
re-execution techniques or information redundancy), a new
direction that is growing in interest among researchers is
to detect the actual particle strike rather than its conse-
quence [16, 23, 36, 47].
This paper proposes a light-weight architectural framework
that can completely eliminate SDC- & DUE-FIT of a core.
The architecture uses acoustic wave detectors for dynamic
particle strike detection. Moreover, the architecture does not
allow errors to escape to user (i.e., updating main memory or
i/o devices) before detection, eliminating SDC. Eliminating
DUE of core is more involved and our proposal relies on a
novel and cantilever-specific checkpointing for recovery.
Another benefit of employing acoustic wave detectors is
that since detectors trigger timely, latent particle strikes do
not accumulate and hence reduces the odds of temporal mul-
tiple bit errors.
In summary, the principal contributions of this paper are:
• We propose an architectural framework to completely elim-
inate the SDC- and DUE-FIT related to soft errors in a core.
It relies on acoustic wave detectors as a unified error detec-
tion mechanism to detect errors in both memory and cur-
rent unprotected logic components in a processor core.
• The Proposed recovery solution is novel and specific to
acoustic wave detectors. It relies on a light-weight check-
pointing mechanism. It requires just one counter for entire
cache to validate checkpoints. We discuss different design
parameters and evaluate cost of checkpointing & recovery.
• The Proposed architecture, besides providing a highly reli-
able core, is able to recover a significant part of the over-
heads associated with current reliability techniques by po-
tentially eliminating error codes and radiation hardened
latches for soft errors. It also significantly reduces the de-
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sign complexity compared to other mainstream reliability
solutions.
• We evaluate the impact of error detection latency on the
cost and complexity of the required recovery technique.
We present different trade-offs related with complexity of
detectors deployment, detection latency and complexity of
recovery mechanism.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the physics behind the soft errors and how we can
detect particle strikes. Section 3 gives an overview of our pro-
posed architecture while explaining the relevance of detection
latency for better error containment and recovery. Section 4
discusses the implementation of the architecture for a base-
line core. Section 5 presents a discussion about how the pro-
posed architecture scales to multicore architectures. We carry
out a detailed evaluation of our proposed architecture in terms
of coverage and overheads in Section 6. Section 7 discusses
related work. Finally, a summary of our main conclusions is
presented in Section 8.
2. Background: Physics of Particle Strikes and
their Detection
Alpha and neutron particles can cause soft errors in semicon-
ductor devices. Upon a collision of a particle with a sili-
con nucleus, the ionization process creates a large number
of electron-hole pairs, which subsequently produce phonons
and photons.
Generation of phonons and photons indicate that a parti-
cle strike results into a shockwave of sound, a flash of light
or a small amount of heat for a very small period of time.
Therefore, we may try to detect particle strikes by detecting
the sound, light or heat.
Phonons and photons gradually result into cascade of car-
riers resulting into either drift current, diffuse current or a
voltage glitch. Therefore, we can detect particle strikes also
by detecting current or voltage glitches.
Several detector-based techniques have been studied in the
past. These detectors work by detecting particle strikes via de-
tection of voltage or current glitches [16, 23, 36] or via detec-
tion of the sound [47]. Comparing the techniques based upon
the area and power overheads, false alarms, type of particles
it can detect, fault coverage in terms of what kind of struc-
tures it can protect (memory or logic blocks), and the intru-
siveness of the design, we decided to use cantilever like struc-
tures [18, 19] as an acoustic wave detector to detect particle
strikes through the sound they generate as proposed in [47].
2.1. Acoustic Wave Detectors: Detection of Particle
Strikes
A typical acoustic wave detector is a cantilever beam like
structure. The particle strike is detected by the change in the
capacitance of the gap between the cantilever and the ground
pad of the detector structure. The cantilevers occupy an area
of one square micron [20], which is roughly the area of one
memory bit (i.e., a typical 6T SRAM cell). It has a detection
range of 5mm. It takes 500ns (i.e., 1000 cycles at 2 GHz) to
detect a strike that is 5mm away from the detector [47]. It is
worth mentioning that detectors do not detect the exact loca-
tion of strikes.
Acoustic detectors adopt silicon based fabrication that is
similar to IC fabrication technology. Placement of detectors
on active silicon can be done without much complications,
making it feasible for detectors to be integrated with the rest
of the circuitry [19]. Cantilever based detectors have been
developed and used extensively to study bio-interactions at
atomic level [26].
Detecting the right particle: Recent studies [20, 47] show
that the cantilever structure can be calibrated in such a way
that it only detects particle strikes that are capable of generat-
ing single even transient (SET) in logic or a single event upset
(SEU) in memory. The same detectors can be used for memo-
ries as well as logic components [6, 12]. Current studies show
that only the particles that have energies larger than 10MeV
when they hit can cause soft-errors [6, 21].
Impact of wrong calibration: Failing to properly cali-
brate the detectors would result into false positives (i.e., detec-
tors’ trigger for the particles that do not carry enough charge
to create a soft error). Considering that the flux of ener-
getic particles at sea level is approximately 25 neutrons/(cm2-
hr), an improbable scenario of detectors triggering for every
harmless particle strike would imply detecting 1 false positive
every 1.3 minutes for a modern general-purpose multi-core
processor.
3. "SDC & DUE 0" Architecture
The main objective of the proposed architecture is to achieve
0 SDC- and DUE-FIT per core. SDC occurs when errors es-
cape and become visible to the user. DUE occurs when error
is detected but we do not have any error recovery mechanism.
Error correction is handled by either moving the system to a
state that does not contain the error (e.g., using checkpoint-
ing) or by an on-the-fly error correction method. Next, we
will see how error detection latency plays an important role
in deciding the overall cost of SDC and DUE handling solu-
tions.
3.1. Effect of Detection Latency on SDC & DUE
Acoustic wave detectors detect all soft errors due to alpha and
neutron strikes. However, not only the detection of the error
but how soon the error is detected is also very important. De-
tection latency defines the degree of error containment. De-
pending on the detection latency, errors can be contained at
various granularities in a processor (i.e., within pipeline or
caches etc.). Efficient error containment is essential for avoid-
ing SDC (e.g., error is visible to the user before its detection)
and it also has an impact on the recovery process.
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Detection Mechanism
Post Consumption Containment Size of Protected Detection Area Performance
Detection Latency Cost Checkpoint Structure Coverage Overhead Overhead
Redundant
execution
Lockstep [45, 46], DMR [1],
DCC [27]
Cycle-by-cycle
detection
Low Small Core 100%
100% [1, 45,
46], 1% [27]
>1.5−2×
RMT [17], CRT [34],
AR-SMT [43]
Hundreds of cycles
& unbounded
High Large Core ∼100%† Low >2×
Instruction
duplication
EDDI [37], SWIFT [42],
CRAFT [41]
Low & unbounded Low Small
Core & Main
memory [37]
<100%∗ [42] Low >150% [37]
Symptom
checks
Error Codes [33],
Hardened latches†† [44]
0 cycles &
bounded
Low –
Main memory [33],
Logic [44]
100% [33]
12.5% [33],
∼55% [44]
Low
BIST [10],
Bulletproof [11]
Periodic & bounded High Large Core
Only harderrors
90% [11]
5%-6% 5%-25%⋆
SWAT [28], Shoestring [14],
Restore [50], Perturbation [38]
Millions of cycles &
unbounded
High Large Core <100%⋆⋆ [14] Low 5-16%
Monitoring
invariants
DIVA [3], Argus [31] Low & bounded Low Small
Core Backend [3],
Core [31]
100% [3],
<100% [31]
6% [3],
17% [31]
5-15%
Sensor
based
Acoustic detectors [47] 100 cycles
∓ (configurable)
& bounded
Low – Cache 100% <1% Low
(V-I) detectors [16, 23, 36]
3-4 cycles &
bounded
Low –
Main memory
& Logic
– High Low
Proposed Architecture
30-100 cycles∓
(configurable) & bounded
Low Small Core
100% detection &
recovery
<1% <0.60%
Table 1: Comparison of different error detection schemes († vulnerability holes in LSQ logic (i.e., MOB logic), ∗ cannot detect
errors in stores, †† does not detect but prevents error, ⋆ only for simple in-order cores, ⋆⋆ cannot detect if fault does not manifest
a symptom, ∓ latency from actual strike instance)
Table 1 reviews the detection latencies for different error
detection techniques once the error is consumed. Bounded la-
tency means the error is detected within a fixed number of cy-
cles, that is known a-priori or can be set by the designer (e.g.,
periodic BIST). Longer detection latency enforces the error
containment to be done at a higher degree of abstraction in a
processor, and results in more complex hardware and/or soft-
ware checkpointing/recovery mechanisms. Excessively long
detection latencies may not be even recoverable. Long detec-
tion latencies can also prevent the fault diagnosis due to weak
correlation between the fault and its symptoms or due to the
limited on-chip tracing storage (i.e., log sizes [9]).
Error detection mechanisms with low detection latency pro-
vide the best tradeoff. Therefore, to achieve SDC-& DUE 0
at a minimum cost we next explore error containment and
recovery for minimum latency (i.e., containment before the
error updates architectural state).
3.2. Achieving SDC-& DUE 0 per Core
In order to achieve 0 SDC, we can equip a processor core
with acoustic wave detectors so it detects all particle strikes
that may cause an error. To have DUE 0 per core, the archi-
tecture must be able to recover from all the errors and restore
correct processor state; this includes architectural register file,
register allocation table (RAT), program counter (PC) etc.
Previous work [47] proposed using acoustic wave detec-
tors in combination with error correction codes to detect and
locate errors in memories. In this section, we extend it and
assess its detection latency and capabilities to address chal-
lenges in achieving SDC-& DUE 0 for an entire core.
Achieving SDC 0 per core: The first option that we ex-
plore is protecting the core for the minimum error detection
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Figure 1: Number of detectors vs. detection latency at 2GHz
latency. It requires that the error is captured before the wrong
value is committed.
Given the dimensions of current core designs, a single de-
tector would suffice to detect all the particle strikes. As men-
tioned in Section 2.1, using just 1 detector implies a worst-
case detection latency of 1000 cycles at 2 GHz, which may
give time for the erroneous instructions to commit before be-
ing detected.
In order to reduce the detection latency, more detectors can
be deployed. Multiple detectors can be deployed in different
topologies, e.g., a mesh formation. Figure 1 shows the detec-
tion latency and complexity for various mesh configurations.
Complexity in terms of increased number of wires is calcu-
lated. It is clear that the detection latency varies exponen-
tially with number of detectors. Also complexity increases
with number of detectors.
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Figure 2: Pipeline of a state of the art processor and the la-
tency of stages
According to Figure 1, we will need need more than 68,000
detectors to guarantee that no instruction will be committed
before it is checked for errors (error detection latency of 1
cycle).
Achieving DUE 0 per core: With 68K detectors we con-
tain the errors before they are committed. If the strike hap-
pened in speculative state, a nuke and retry would suffice to
recover. However, if the strike was in the architectural state,
recovery would be somewhat more involved. One option is
to use error correcting codes. However, majority of the struc-
tures that hold the architectural state (i.e., architectural regis-
ter file) do not have error correcting codes. Therefore, we opt
to take checkpoints periodically (that include shadow copies
of the architectural state).
In a nutshell, for having an SDC- & DUE 0 core we will
need 68K detectors. This implies an area overhead equiv-
alent to having 68K bits of SRAM (∼7KB cache). More-
over, as shown in Figure 1 the interconnects to the micro-
controller from 68K detectors increases the complexity and
require more than 5 metal layers which pose significant chal-
lenges in place and route [4, 35].
Next, we will explore an optimized architecture that re-
duces the number of detectors without compromising the re-
liability coverage.
3.3. Divide and Conquer for SDC- & DUE 0
We made the observation that errors in different stages of
pipeline take different time until they propagate outside the
containment area (i.e., before they commit). To reduce the
number of detectors for containment before an erroneous in-
struction is committed, we study the pipeline structures and
analyze the time each instruction spends in traversing through
the pipeline. We collect the latency requirements for all the
structures to provide coverage to all instructions. This gives
Pipeline stage #Detectors
Fetch + Decode (including I-Cache, D-Cache, TLBs) 1787
Rename + Schedule 170
Execute 461
Writeback + Commit 139
Total 2561
Table 2: Required number of detectors for containment in core
us an insight of the required detection latency for each struc-
ture in the core.
Figure 2 shows the pipeline of our base core running at
2GHz. It shows the latency for the different stages of the
pipeline up to the commit stage. We identified four differ-
ent paths with different latency: (i) fetch/decode to commit
takes 20 cycles, (ii) rename/scheduler to commit takes 15 cy-
cles, (iii) execute to commit takes 8-10 cycles, and (iv) write-
back/retire to commit takes 4-6 cycles.
From this initial observation, we identified that some data-
flow paths are more critical (i.e., writeback to commit) and
will need stricter detection latency requirements for error con-
tainment. So, instead of protecting all the functional units in
the pipeline for a common detection latency we propose to
put detectors for individual functional units. By protecting
each functional unit for its allowable detection latency we
can reduce the number of detectors and still achieve 0 SDC.
In order to have 0 DUE we keep low cost shadow copies of
architecture state as described in Section 3.2.
Up to this point, we contain errors before they commit and
as shown in Table 2, it requires 2.5K detectors for functional
blocks in the pipeline for their allowable detection latency
requirements.
Overhead: 2.5K detectors incur an area overhead equiva-
lent to 2.5K bit SRAM. Complexity for accommodating 2500
(low latency) interconnects occupy ∼ 4 metal layers causing
an unacceptable area overhead as shown in Figure 1. More-
over, control circuit for handling 2500 logic inputs is complex
and requires a tree of logic-OR gates (∼22K extra CMOS
cells).
3.4. Containment in Core: Recap
We realized that achieving DUE 0 by recovering within the
core demands 68K detectors. To reduce the area overhead,
we explore a modification that protects each pipeline stage
based on its allowable detection latency. By relaxing error
detection latency requirement, the number of detectors for ef-
ficient error containment goes down to 2.5K. However, the
resulting design is complex and the area overhead of 2.5K
interconnects is still unacceptable.
Hence, we propose to extend the error containment area
beyond the commit stage to the cache hierarchy.
3.5. Proposed Architecture
Including caches in the error containment boundary implies
that we can further relax the detection latency requirement
4
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Figure 3: Error Containment Architecture
which in turn reduces the required number of detectors. Ac-
cording to Figure 1 relaxing detection latency constraint by
10× (i.e., from 10 cycles to 100 cycles) reduces the number of
required detectors by 90× and this reflects in 100× decrease
in complexity and interconnects overhead. We believe that a
good trade-off between detection latency, area overhead and
complexity lies within 30-300 detectors, which means 30-100
cycles latency at 2GHz.
Our proposed architecture to provide DUE 0 core consists
of the following steps:
Error detection: We use acoustic wave detectors to detect
particle strikes in the core. We opt for a simple configura-
tion with a number of detectors in the range of 30-300, which
provides a detection latency in the range of 30-100 cycles run-
ning at 2GHz.
Data error containment: We choose our containment
area to be the cache hierarchy. Figure 3 shows the different
error containment boundaries for an architecture with a sin-
gle core and three levels of cache. Notice that the boundary
of the containment area can be configured to be at any cache
level. We assume that the caches themselves are protected by
some mechanism. A datum will be correct once it has spent
more time than the worst-case error detection latency in the
cache (this way, we guarantee that the datum was produced
correctly). In order to guarantee containment, we do not al-
low any data to go out of containment region before making
sure that data is error free.
Data checkpointing: Containment boundary helps to de-
cide the checkpoint boundary. By definition, containment
boundary lies within the checkpoint boundary. Otherwise,
there is a possibility of corrupting the checkpoints. Every
conceptual checkpoint will consist of the architectural state
(e.g., register file, program counter, etc) and the memory data.
Process of checkpointing would include saving register val-
ues and flushing cache block values within the checkpoint
boundaries that have been modified since the last checkpoint.
Data recovery: Upon an error, data recovery consists of
invalidating all temporal data within the checkpoint boundary,
and resume the execution from the latest checkpoint. Notice
that this checkpoint will consume the data from outside the
checkpoint area (and therefore, the containment area), that is
guaranteed to be correct.
Next, we will discuss implementation aspects of proposed
architecture.
4. Implementation
Without loss of generality, we will use as a running example a
system comprising a single core and two levels of cache, with
LLC as the boundary of the containment and checkpoint area.
For instance, a system with three levels of cache, and L3 as
the boundary would be implemented exactly the same way,
with L3 acting as our described LLC, and L1 & L2 collec-
tively acting as our L1 cache. For the rest of the text, we as-
sume that worst-case detection latency for the acoustic wave
detectors is ErrorDetectionLatency.
4.1. Error Containment Mechanism
The purpose of the containment mechanism is to make sure
that only error free data goes beyond the containment area.
In our implementation, where we use acoustic wave detectors
as error detection mechanism, only data that has spent more
than ErrorDetectionLatency cycles within the containment
boundary has been produced in the right way.
We propose to add one counter for entire cache within the
containment area. The counter monitors the modified data
in the cache and keeps track of the correctness by counting
ErrorDetectionLatency cycles.
Initially, the counter is set to force unknown state (i.e.,
counter = "X") as there is no modified data in the cache. We
reset the counter (i.e., counter = "0") once any cache line
in the given cache is modified following a write operation.
Until counter finishes counting ErrorDetectionLatency cy-
cles, the cache is in quarantine as we are not sure if it con-
tains erroneous data or correct data. Once counter reaches
ErrorDetectionLatency cycles the cache is said to be verified.
Read operations do not affect the state of counter.
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Figure 4: Timeline of the events in cache
Example: Figure 4 shows the basic events for a cache line
in the cache. Before the write operation the line is clean (i.e.,
dirty bit, D = "0") and counter = "X". Following awrite opera-
tion at time t, D = "1" and counter is reset (i.e., counter = "0").
After ErrorDetectionLatency cycles the entire cache is veri-
fied. Now, we will discuss how the normal cache operation is
carried out in the proposed architecture. For that purpose we
will be using Figure 5, which shows different events that may
happen to cache lines within the cache of containment area.
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Figure 5: Containment for evictions caused by read and write
operations
4.1.1. Dealing with Verified Cache. Figure 5(ii) shows the
case of evictions of dirty cache lines in a verified cache, which
are allowed to make forward progress and leave the contain-
ment boundary. Later, they can be part of the new checkpoint.
4.1.2. Dealing with Not-Verified Cache. Not-verified cache
is in quarantine. Read operations from the core do not alter
the state of counter, since potentially erroneous data will not
leave the containment area.
Evictions from L1 cache: Figure 5(i) shows the actions
to be taken upon an eviction of a dirty cache line when the
L1 cache is not verified. First, we will evict the cache line to
LLC. The counter could be inherited or pessimistically reset
at LLC. Alternatively, we could stall until the L1 cache is
verified before evicting modified cache line to LLC. In this
work, we do not stall the processor as it can have negative
impact on the performance.
Evictions from LLC cache: Evictions of dirty cache lines
from LLC (i.e., containment boundary) when LLC is not ver-
ified are not allowed as is the case of Figure 5(iii). In such
event we will stall until LLC is verified.
In Section 6 we analyze all the cases discussed above for
their impact on performance and observe the tradeoff between
error containment area and cost of containment using real life
workloads.
4.2. Creating Checkpoints
The checkpointing process should include:
• Copying the architectural state.
• Saving the program counter.
• Waiting for all caches to be verified.
• Writing back all dirty data in lower (verified) caches to
main memory.
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Figure 6: Checkpointing for evictions caused by read and
write operations
For checkpointing the architectural state we suggest to use
shadow structures as proposed in [13]. The copy of the pro-
gram counter is stored in a special register. All these struc-
tures are assumed to have error recovery capabilities (e.g.,
ECC).
We anticipate that writing all dirty data present in all caches
to memory may be expensive. Similar to previous works [24,
30], we adopt an incremental checkpointing where only dirty
lines from the caches closest to the core (L1 in our running
example) are written back to the cache in the boundary of the
checkpoint area (LLC in our running example). Dirty lines in
the LLC are now part of the checkpoint. In this configuration,
the data part of the checkpoint will be split between the LLC
and main memory.
In order to implement such optimization, we add a check-
point bit (CH) in every cache line of the cache in the check-
point boundary (i.e., every cache line of LLC). Initially the
checkpoint bit is set to "0", which means that the line is not
part of the checkpoint.
Periodicity: In this proposal we take periodic incremental
checkpoints. The frequency of checkpoints and its implica-
tions are further discussed in Section 6. Next, we discuss how
we handle the events to cache lines of cache in the checkpoint
boundary (LLC in our running example).
Figure 6(i) shows the case of a dirty cache line in LLC that
is part of the checkpoint. In that case we allow any eviction
since the cache lines are already part of the checkpoint and do
not affect the recovery of the correct architectural state. More-
over, write hits to a cache line that is part of the checkpoint
will result into an eviction as the cache line cannot be modi-
fied without having a safe copy in main memory. Therefore,
we evict the cache line to memory, reset the checkpoint bit
and then serve the write as shown in Figure 6(ii). Finally, in
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the case of Figure 6(iii) an eviction of a dirty line that is not
part of a checkpoint in LLC will force a checkpoint before
being evicted to memory.
Waiting for verified data: It is important to note that in or-
der to take a checkpoint, we need to stall until the caches (L1
and LLC) are verified. Once they are verified, we can start
writing back all the cache lines to the checkpoint boundary.
4.2.1. Validating the Checkpoint. Checkpointing process is
not free from suffering particle strikes. Therefore, we need to
pay careful attention to guarantee that the checkpoint is valid.
To avoid the creation of corrupted checkpoints, we also
add one global counter CheckpointValid to LLC (i.e., cache
in the checkpoint boundary). As soon as the checkpoint pro-
cess is finished the checkpoint bit is set. At the same time
the counter CheckpointValid is set to ErrorDetectionLatency,
and we let it decrement. After ErrorDetectionLatency cycles,
when CheckpointValid reaches 0, it asserts the valid signal in-
dicating a valid checkpoint as no error was detected.
CheckpointValid counter guarantees the correctness of the
checkpoint in the LLC. However, in order to be able to re-
cover we must keep two copies of the state (one for the yet-
to-be-valid checkpoint, and the other of previous valid check-
point) of RAT, RF and PC. If an error was detected before
the CheckpointValid reaches 0, we would just rollback to last
valid checkpoint, ignoring the checkpoint bit of all cache lines
in LLC.
4.3. Recovering from Error
Upon a particle strike, one of the detectors would trigger de-
tecting the error. Recovering from an error requires a few
steps:
1. Once we know the checkpoint is valid (CheckpointValid =
"0") the recovery may begin. If not, we have to discard
current checkpoint as explained earlier, and apply the re-
covery algorithm.
2. Restore architectural state from shadow copy.
3. Invalidate all the dirty lines and set the counter of L1 cache
to force unknown state (i.e. counter = "X").
4. Invalidate all the dirty lines of LLC that are not part of the
checkpoint.
5. Set the counter of LLC to force unknown state (i.e. counter
= "X").
4.4. Intrusiveness of Design
The proposed architecture is extremely simple. It achieves
SDC- & DUE 0 core using just one counter for caches within
the containment area (i.e., L1 and LLC). It also requires one
checkpoint bit for every cache line in the cache that is the
checkpoint boundary (i.e., LLC). To validate the checkpoint
we have one global counter CheckpointValid for LLC.
Regarding the checkpoint itself, we maintain 2 of the most
recent copies of RAT, RF and PC, encoded using ECC. Hav-
ing a shadow register file for checkpointing register files and
keeping the log of register alias table incurs little area and
power overhead [13]. Besides their impact on performance is
minimal as retrieving and saving the data can be done simul-
taneously and in 1 cycle.
Also during the recovery process, invalidation of cache
lines and clearing the checkpoint bits and counters can be
done in one cycle as proposed in [8].
5. Scalability of Solution
In this section, we discuss the scalability of the proposed ar-
chitecture in multicore systems and describe the interaction
with the processor during normal operation. We also define
the most important challenges for achieving high levels of er-
ror protection and error containment.
5.1. Shared Memory Architecture
In a shared memory architecture, the LLC is physically dis-
tributed in multiple banks but logically unified among all
cores. As data are shared among different cores, the allocated
blocks and all cache accesses are controlled via a coherency
protocol. For our baseline core, we have chosen a MOESI
protocol [22].
5.1.1. MOESI Protocol for Error Containment. The
MOESI protocol allows several copies of cache lines across
multiple processors to be different from the copy in shared
LLC. Owned (O) cache lines are responsible to share data
among the requesting processors. Owned state also writes
back the data in the case of replacement. All other cache line
copies remains in Shared (S) state. Moreover, cache lines in
Modified (M) and Owned (O) states hold dirty data. The most
important issue in a shared memory architecture is that a dirty
block can be directly read by another processor without writ-
ing back to the shared memory.
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Figure 7: Shared memory accesses for DUE 0 architecture
Let us show the potential issue through an example. We
consider 2 cores with shared memory. Figure 7 shows a
scenario in which “core 0” has taken a checkpoint at time
Tc. At instance t1 “core 0” writes in cache. At time t2
“core 1” requests a read from the cache in “core 0” follow-
ing a cache miss in local cache. Now, if there is an error at
time tstrike in “core 0”, detectors from “core 0” trigger after
ErrorDetectionLatency cycles at time t3. Now, as soon as
“core 0” recovers using the local checkpoint taken at time Tc,
“core 1” will have invalid data. To avoid such cases we pro-
pose to stall all the read requests coming from other cores
7
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Figure 8: MOESI protocol: Transitions are shown in the trig-
ger ->action format. Underlined transition triggers and actions
are the same as uniprocessor architecture. The transition trig-
gers in gray boxes are extensions for multicore shared mem-
ory architecture. "Wr" stands for write and "Rd" stands for
read operation. "Stall" -> ErrorDetectionLatency cycles.
and once the cache is verified, it can service read requests
from other cores.
5.1.2. MOESI Protocol for Checkpointing.We adopt an in-
cremental checkpointing, similar to the case of uniprocessor
architecture explained in Section 4.
Compared to uniprocessor system, shared memory intro-
duces a new situation that needs to be handled to properly
create checkpoints: when one processor invalidates dirty data
from another processor that is not part of the checkpoint. If
it turns out that the requestor processor suffers an error, and
triggers a recovery, it has to trigger another recovery in the
owner processor in such a way that invalidated data can be
recovered. In order to deal with this case, we employ previ-
ously proposed solutions that keep track of the sharing his-
tory [25, 39]. We summarize the adapted MOESI protocol in
Figure 8.
5.1.3. Recovering from Error. If a core triggers an error,
data recovery takes place in the same way as described for
uniprocessor. The only caveat is that we will have to check
the sharing history in order to initiate the recovery process in
other processors cores [25].
5.2. Dealing with Interrupts and Exceptions
In this section we will discuss howwe can handle I/O requests
and exceptions.
5.2.1. Handling Interrupts. Interrupts are asynchronous
events coming from the core and external devices (i.e., disk
controller). Interrupts are crucial, as the requestor is outside
the error containment area.
Similar to [40], we allow only error free stores to propagate
to memory. We propose to buffer the requests in local mem-
ory, protected with ECC for ErrorDetectionLatency cycles.
This assures the correctness of each outgoing store and all its
Parameter Value
Number of Processors 1-16
Instr Window / ROB 16/48 entries
Frequency 2GHz
L1 I/D Cache per Core 16 KB, 4-way, 64B
LLC Cache per bank 256 KB, 4-way, 64B (distributed 1-16 banks)
L1 access Latency 2 cycles
LLC access Latency 6 cycles
Table 3: Configuration Parameters
preceding instructions. The size of the buffer should be large
enough to hold the I/O requests for ErrorDetectionLatency
cycles. Also, in order to facilitate successful recovery, as we
allow all the error free stores to commit to memory after the
last checkpoint, we must keep the load values issued so far
in the buffer. Upon recovery we replay the loads so all the
committed stores are correctly reproduced.
We propose to have one buffer for each I/O device to facil-
itate successful recovery, with an expected interrupt response
time penalty of 30 to 1000 ns, which is acceptable for typical
asynchronous interrupts.
5.2.2. Dealing with Exceptions. Exceptions are synchronous
events such as a "div 0" instruction or a page fault on instruc-
tion fetch. When the exception occurs, the corresponding en-
try of ROB is marked. Since in modern processors excep-
tions are rare events [22], we propose to delay the exception
service by ErrorDetectionLatency cycles until all potential
errors have been detected. In case of no error detection, we
assume the exception to be genuine and invoke the respective
handler and handle it precisely.
5.2.3. Context switching andMulti-programming. In order
to handle context-switching, we allow the preempted thread
to swap out and we propose to stall for ErrorDetectionLa-
tency to make sure the preempted thread is error-free. Af-
ter the context switch we take a checkpoint of the incoming
thread. This is to make sure that in an event of error due to par-
ticle strike the thread can recover its state from the instance
after the context switch.
6. Evaluation
In this section, we analyze how error detection latency im-
pacts the choice of error containment boundary. Next, we
study the trade-off between checkpoint period and checkpoint
boundary. Finally, we evaluate the performance impact of the
selected configuration for uniprocessor and multicore system
with data sharing and non-data sharing applications.
6.1. Experimental Setup
To evaluate the proposed architecture, we use a full-system
execution-driven simulator extended with OPAL and GEMS
tool-set [29]. We modified the memory hierarchy model to
adapt it to the proposed architecture. Table 3 enlists the im-
portant configuration parameters.
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(a) Forced checkpoints (b) Eviction due to write hits (c) Writeback from L1 to LLC
Figure 9: Checkpoint events in LLC checkpoint boundary
We simulate two different configurations as follows:
6.1.1. Single core system. All caches are private to the pro-
cessor. All the LLC misses are served by the main mem-
ory. We evaluate the performance of single core system using
SPEC CPU2006 benchmark set with the reference input set.
6.1.2. Multicore system.We implement a 16-core multicore
system. We perform our analysis based on the following cat-
egories of applications, with a trace run of 20M cycles.
• Non-data sharing applications: To obtain various trade-
off details for Non-data sharing applications we replicate
the same application for all 16 cores (i.e., all 16 cores run-
ning the same application independently). We evaluate the
performance of this configuration using SPEC CPU2006
benchmark set with reference input set.
• Shared Memory Applications: For our 16 core system,
we use the SPEC OMP2001 benchmark set with an appro-
priate input set in order to evaluate the trade-offs.
6.2. Error Detection Latency vs Containment Area
We first analyze the trade-off between the error detection la-
tency and the size of the error containment area. As we men-
tioned in Section 4.1, non-verified data is not allowed to leave
the error containment and we need to stall until data is guaran-
teed to be correct, which degrades performance. We evaluate
the range of detection latency 30 to 100 cycles as proposed in
Section 3.5.
Detection latency Total #Stalls Avg. Wait cycles
10 cycles 6111 3.45
30 cycles 15729 25.99
100 cycles 38049 40.67
1000 cycles 55164 108.2
Table 4: Containment cost (i.e., #Stalls and wait cycles for
each stall) for containment boundary limited to L1
Table 4 shows result for having one counter for entire L1
cache. It shows total number of evictions that create stalls
when L1 is not verified. With increase in detection latency
the average wait cycles also increase, which in turn increase
the cost of containment. For a detection latency of 100 cycles
the total stalls (i.e., over a period of 20M cycles) are more
than 35K, i.e., having one stall every 1K cycles. It also shows
the average number of cycles that we need to stall for the non-
verified L1 cache to be verified.
Overall, we observe that for an ErrorDetectionLatency of
100 cycles, we experience a 7% slowdown only due to con-
tainment in L1. Even for 30 cycles, slowdown is 2%.
For the sake of comparison, we also experimented with
more expensive solutions: (i) having one counter for each
line, and (ii) one counter per set. Compared to having a
counter per line, we observe an increase in total stalls by 5%
for one counter per set, and 21% to one counter for the whole
cache. Unfortunately, the slowdown due to containment is
still high when having a counter per line, with 5.4% slow-
down for 100 cycles of ErrorDetectionLatency, and 1.6% for
30 cycles.
When moving containment boundary to LLC, we observed
only a handful of stalls. Therefore, we conclude that the best
option is to have LLC as containment boundary, with an error
detection latency of 100 cycles (which requires 30 detectors)
and a slowdown of 0.01%.
6.3. Checkpoint Length vs Checkpoint Area
Now, we observe the tradeoff between the checkpoint length
and the cost of the checkpointing. LLC is the checkpoint
boundary. In our adopted architecture as described in Sec-
tion 4.2, we have identified the major factors that affect the
performance as follows:
1. Wait cycles to guarantee that caches in containment bound-
ary are verified.
2. The write-back of dirty cache lines to the checkpoint
boundary upon checkpoint creation.
3. Forced checkpoint events due to evictions of dirty lines
that are not part of checkpoint.
4. Evictions to memory due to write hits on dirty and check-
pointed lines.
Notice that factors 3-4 are runtime factors, and will largely
depend on the footprint of the application (and therefore, the
size of the selected checkpoint boundary and the checkpoint
period). On the other hand, factors 1-2 are the overhead that
is paid at checkpoint creation.
Figure 9(a) shows the number of forced checkpoints, per
checkpoint length, for different checkpoint periods. As one
9
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Figure 10: Average number of dirty lines to be written back
from L1 to LLC
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Figure 11: Average number of wait-cycles until LLC is verified
can see, the number of extra checkpoints is negligible, and
therefore we can opt for long checkpoints in the order of mil-
lions of cycles. Figure 9(b) shows the number of extra evic-
tions to main memory caused by write hits on checkpointed
lines. Numbers are relative to the length of the checkpoint
period. Regarding the cost of creating a checkpoint, we show
in Figure 9(c) the extra write-backs we have to perform when
taking a checkpoint. As shown in the figure, increasing the
checkpoint period from 100K cycles to 2M cycles brings
down the write-back traffic by more than 10×, and after that
benefits flatten. Therefore, we opt for a checkpoint length of
2M cycles.
We detail the results for a 2M checkpoint period for our
workloads in Figure 10. The results indicate that, for every
2M cycles we have to write-back 97 dirty cache lines from
verified L1 cache to LLC.
Finally, we assess how much time we need to wait until we
can create the checkpoint. Figure 11 shows the average wait
cycles for the LLC to be verified before taking a checkpoint
for a checkpoint period of 2M cycles. For a detection latency
of 100 cycles, every 2M cycles we have to wait 50 cycles to
take a checkpoint in LLC.
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Figure 12: Impact of containment and checkpointing LLC
cache in unicore architecture
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Figure 13: Slowdown due to containment and checkpointing
LLC cache in multi-core system for shared memory applica-
tions
Next, we will see how the performance is impacted in the
proposed architecture.
6.4. Uniprocessor Performance
Figure 12 evaluates the proposed single core architecture in
terms of performance vs. cost of containment and recov-
ery. The experimentation shows that the average performance
slowdown is 0.17%. We notice that the average performance
degradation due to containment is almost 0, since there are
no eviction of dirty lines from non-verified LLC cache. The
performance degradation due to checkpointing is 0.15%.
6.5. Performance of Multicore for Non-data Sharing Ap-
plications
We observe similar results for 16 core system for non-data
sharing workloads. Figure is omitted due to lack of space.
Notice, that we depict the results for the slowest core of the
16 running. The total degradation in performance is 0.19%.
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6.6. Multicore Shared Memory Performance
Figure 13 shows the impact on performance for 16 cores
shared memory architecture. Again, we collect data for the
slowest core to reach the 20M cycles. As one can see, the
average slowdown is 0.3%. Again even in the case of shared
memory we do not have any dirty evictions from LLC before
LLC is verified. Hence, the slowdown due to containment
is zero. In shared memory architecture we have more cache
lines evicting after the LLC is verified. This results into in-
creased forced checkpoints.
6.7. Summary and Hardware Cost
The proposed architecture is extremely light-weight. It uses
30 detectors (i.e., area is 30 SRAM memory cells) for er-
ror detection, for a worst-case detection latency of 100 cy-
cles. The area overhead of 30 interconnects is also reasonably
small. Controller circuit to signal error detection is extremely
simple and requires 6 3-input and 2 2-input logic-OR gates.
We implement the containment boundary at the LLC. Con-
tainment architecture consists of L1 and LLC with one
counter each, to count 100 cycles. Additionally, we will need
one counter for LLC to check the checkpoint validity. All 3
counters are 7-bit, non-repeating word counters.
Checkpointing requires a physical Checkpoint bit for every
cache line in LLC. We propose to use a checkpoint length of
2M cycles, which guarantees a good trade-off between check-
point overhead and recovery time. For recovery of architec-
ture state it requires 2 shadow copies of the architectural state
(register files, RAT and PC). We also use a trivial control cir-
cuit for clearing theCheckpoint bit and counters in one cycle.
7. Related Work
Several popular error detection mechanisms have been com-
pared and summarized in Table 1. The most effective method
of dealing with soft errors in memory components is to use
codes like parity, or ECC [33]. Execution redundancy is a
widely used technique to detect errors in the logic, either us-
ing the multithreading capabilities [34, 43] or hardware re-
dundancy [45, 46]. DIVA [3] uses a simple in-order core as a
checker for an out-of-order core. Triple redundancy systems
are used in commercial processors (i.e., HP NonStop archi-
tecture [7]) and "Pair & spare" systems [5] and can achieve
0 DUE without roll-back. The work of [48] shows how to
handle the DUE problem in L1 caches.
Current work focuses more on detection latency and its
impact on containment and cost of recovery unlike [47].
CARER [24], Cherry(-MP) [25, 30] & others [2, 11, 25,
27, 39, 51] are popular for speculation recovery. The
proposed solution is extremely simple and uses only one
counter per cache (i.e., one counter for L1 and one for LLC).
CARER [24], Cherry(-MP) [25, 30] and others do not benefit
from this optimization. Moreover, CARER-like implementa-
tion (i.e., containment in L1) causes 7% slowdown as shown
in Section 6.2. In contrast to solutions similar to [11], the
proposed architecture protects the entire CMP system.
8. Conclusions
This paper presents a novel architecture to eliminate particle
strike induced SDC & DUE FIT. The architecture uses acous-
tic wave detectors to detect errors. The proposed architec-
ture minimizes hardware overhead and performance cost. We
showed that even in the worst case scenario, the proposed ar-
chitecture detects only 1 false positive every 1.3 minutes for
current general purpose multi-core systems. Next, we pro-
posed an error containment mechanism within the cache hi-
erarchy to manage the detection latency. Finally, we achieve
DUE-FIT 0 by enabling a low cost checkpointing mechanism.
Our proposed architecture eliminates particle strike in-
duced SDC&DUE FIT, for systems ranging from one core to
16-core with shared memory with the worst-case performance
overhead is 0.60% for shared memory systems.
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